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COMMENTS
status by Louisiana law. The court's view was that the maker's
liability to the endorsee was to be governed by the law of the
place where the obligation was to be performed. Although the
court clearly applied the law of the obligor's contract, the
opinion stands alone and is not from a court of last resort. The
question remains an open one in Louisiana.
HENRY G. PAVY*
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS: SUBSTANCE OR PROCEDURE?
The rule is settled in the conflict of laws that problems of
the law of torts are to be determined according to the law of
the place of wrong.1 This and other choice of law rules are de-
signed to create substantial uniformity of result in legal contro-
versies irrespective of where the parties may desire to litigate
their grievances. 2 The Utopian goal in the conflict of laws is that
every controversy, regardless of where it arises, be decided by all
courts in exactly the same manner. Unfortunately, this goal could
not be completely attained even if the choice of law rules were
the same everywhere. The organization of courts, rules regulating
process, pleading, evidence and other similar matters vary from
state to state and from country to country. The necessity for ef-
fective 'and expeditious administration of justice makes it im-
possible for a court to duplicate such foreign details.3 Thus, for
their own convenience and protection, courts, as early as the
Thirteenth Century, adopted the rule, which today is axiomatic,
that, while problems of substantive law may be determined by
foreign law, for example, in torts cases, the law of the place of
wrong, procedural matters will always be determined by the
forum's own rules.4 Hence there arises the problem of demarcat-
ing problems of substantive law from problems of procedure. In
this respect, it has been suggested that procedural problems "are
those which concern methods of presenting to a court the opera-
tive facts upon which legal relations, depend" and that problems
of substantive law are "those which concern the legal effect of
those facts after they have been established." 5 When one of the
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Opelousas, Bar.
1. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) §§ 378, 384.
2. Id. at introductory note to c. 12.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at § 585.
5. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 128.
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parties to a litigation, which by the applicable choice of law rule
is to be decided- by the law of a place other than the forum, pleads
for the application of a foreign rule which is different from a
corresponding rule of the forum, it becomes necessary for the
court to determine which is applicable. If the court classifies or
characterizes its own rule as procedural, the law of the forum
will be applied; if not, the foreign rule will be applied, unless the
court should find that the foreign rule, being "procedural," is not
intended to be applied by foreign courts. Whether, and, if so, to
what extent a foreign characterization of the foreign rule as pro-
cedural should be considered, is one of the most controversial
problems of the conflict of laws, which need not be considered
here.6
In the early part of the Nineteenth Century, Anglo-American
courts manifested a marked tendency toward classifying prob-
lems as procedural. 7 Courts viewed foreign law with suspicious
eyes and resented encroachment upon the "true law" of the
forum. This tendency, though -considerably weaker, is still ob-
servable today. The device of classifying a matter as procedural
Is especially utilized by the courts as a backhanded method of
protecting the public policy of the forum.8
In the average case, the court, without discussing choice of
law policy, simply classifies a matter as one of substance or pro-
cedure according to preconceived notions. The result is that the
basic choice of law policies and the raison d'6tre of the distinc-
tion between substance and procedure are ignored. In recent
years, many notable writers have taken the position that courts
should re-evaluate the underlying policies of choice of law rules
and delimit the concept of procedure in the conflict of laws.9
All admit that a balance must be struck. The basic choice of law
policy is to achieve a uniform solution to a given problem regard-
6. For detailed studies of the characterization problem see 1 Rabel, The
Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (1945) 47-60; Robertson, Characteri-
zation in the Conflict of Laws (1940); Beckett, The Question of Classifica-
tion ("Qualification") in Private International Law (1934) 15 Brit. Y. B. Int.
L. 4,6; Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1937) 53 L.Q.
Rev. 235; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws
(1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 247.
7. Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 64; Stumberg, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 147; Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of
Laws (1923) 32 Yale L.J. 311, 327.
8. Ibid.
9. Hancock, op. cit. supra note 7, at 76. See Stumberg, op. cit. supra note
5, at 128, n. 1; Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws
(1933) 42 Yale L.J. 333; Lorenzen, supra note 7; McClintock, Distinguishing
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
933; Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof (1944) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153.
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less of the forum. A distinction is drawn between substantive and
procedural matters to enable a court to discard those foreign rules
which would seriously inconvenience the court and hamper the
effective administration of justice at the forum. It would seem,
therefore, that the court of the forum should apply all properly
applicable foreign laws as are likely to have a material bearing
upon the result of the controversy unless such application would
seriously inconvenience or hamper the court.'0
Turning now to the doctrine of contributory negligence and
some of its more important aspects, it will be seen for the most
part that the choice of law rules are unsettled.
Contributory Negligence as a Defense
In general, the problem of what defenses are open against
a cause of action is as much one of substantive law as that of
determining the operative facts upon which the existence of a
cause of action depends. Thus, if a plaintiff is entitled to have
his rights determined according to the law of the place of wrong,
the defendant is likewise entitled to invoke any defense there
recognized." The cases in this country are uniform in holding
that the effect of contributory negligence as a defense is a
question of substantive law.12 When, therefore, by the law of the
place of wrong, contributory negligence operates as an absolute
bar to an action, it will have the same effect at the forum, a con-
trary rule of the forum notwithstanding.' 3 The court of the forum
will also apply the well-known exceptions to the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, the "last clear chance"' 4 and "humanitar-
ian" 15 rules, when it is proved that they form a part of the law
of the place of wrong.
Civil law countries, as well as some American states, in
10. See Hancock, op. cit. supra note 7, at 76; Cook, supra note 9; Morgan,
supra note 9.
11. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 388.
12. Representative cases: Caine v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 209
Ala. 181, 95 So. 876, 32 A.L.R. 793 (1923); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 154 Ark. 413, 242 S.W. 813 (1922); Kingery v. Donnel, 222 Iowa
241, 268 N.W. 617 (1936); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Whitlow, 105 Ky. 1, 43 S.W
711, 41 L.R.A. 614 (1897); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Keiffer, 132 Ky. 419, 113 S.W.
433 (1908); Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112, 68
A.L.R. 801 (1929); Jones v. Louisiana Western Ry., 243 S.W. 976 (Tex. 1922);
Morisette v. Canadian P. R.R., 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl. 1102 (1904).
13. East Tennessee V. & G. R.R. v. Lewis, 89 Tenn. 235, 14 S.W. 603 (1890).
Accord: In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.(2d) 559, 565 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1931).
14. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 154 Ark. 413, 242 S.W.
813 (1922); Gregory v. Maine Central Railroad Co., 317 Mass. 636, 59 N.E.
(2d) 471, 159 A.L.R. 714 (1945); Cox v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 331 Mo. 910, 55
S.W.(2d) 685 (1932).
15. Kingery v. Donnel, 222 Iowa 241, 268 N.W. 617 (1936).
1950]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which the doctrine of contributory negligence has been abol-
ished, follow the different doctrine of comparative negligence. A
problem arises when the place of wrong follows one and the
forum the other of these two doctrines.' In the main, two argu-
ments have been advanced against the application of the "civil
law" rule when suit is brought in a jurisdiction which adheres
to the common law rule: First, it is contended that it is contrary
to the public policy of the forum to apply such a rule. The courts
have consistently rejected the argument. 17 Second, it is argued
that comparative negligence is a procedural matter, unconnected
with substantive rights, and, hence, not applicable at the forum.
Only one case,' 8 now overruled, has squarely held that the doc-
trine of comparative negligence is a procedural matter. The now
universal rule is that the doctrine is a matter of substance giving
a right to recover not recognized by the common law.19 Any other
rule would ignore choice of law policy because, if contributory
negligence is allowed to defeat a recovery, clearly the plaintiff
cannot recover in the same manner an? tk the same extent as if
the action had been brought at the place of wrong. It is important
to add that the court of the forum, in applying the doctrine, suf-
fers little, if any, inconvenience.
The courts, whether aware of choice of law policy or not,
are on sound ground when they classify the determination of the
respective effects of contributory and comparative negligence as
a matter of substance. The quest for uniformity of result is fur-
thered with a minimum of inconvenience to the court of the
forum.
Contributory Negligence and the Function of Court and Jury
In some states the question of whether the plaintiff is guilty
of contributory negligence is, in all cases, for the jury; while in
other states the question may be decided by either the court or
16. This problem would seem to be of importance in Louisiana since the
neighboring state of Mississippi follows the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence. Despite the proximity of the two states and the ever-increasing num-
ber of automobile accident cases, no Louisiana cases have been found wherein
this problem was discussed.
17. Caine v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876, 32
A.L.R. 793 (1923); Morrisette v. Canadian P. Ry., 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl. 1102
(1904).
18. Johnson v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 91 Iowa 248, 59 N.W. 66 (1894),
overruled by name in Kingery v. Donnel, 222 Iowa 241, 268 N.W. 617 (1936).
19. Leading cases: Caine v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 209 Ala. 181,
95 So. 876, 32 A.L.R. 793 (1923); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Whitlow, 105 Ky. 1,
43 S.W. 711, 41 L.R.A. 614 (1897); Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y.
127, 169 N.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 801 (1929); Morrisette v. Canadian P. R.R., 76
Vt. 267, 56 Atl. 1102 (1904).
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the jury, depending upon whether reasonable men might differ
on the issue. If the place of wrong has a constitutional provision
or statute providing that contributory negligence is a question
for the jury and the law of the forum provides that the court
may, in the absence of a doubt, decide the question without sub-
mitting the case to the jury, the court must make a choice of
law.20 According to the traditional concept of procedure, it would
seem clear that a rule regulating the function of court and jury
is a matter of procedure.2 1 A majority of the cases do hold that
such a foreign rule is procedural and hence not applicable at the
forum.22 There is, however, a contrary view.2 3 It cannot be doubt-
ed that in negligence cases such a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision greatly increases the plaintiff's chance of success and often
proves to be the decisive factor in the case. It is a matter of
common knowledge that in a negligence case the average jury
has a great deal of sympathy for plaintiffs, especially where the
defendant is a corporation. In view of the effect of such a pro-
vision on the outcome of litigation, if the quest for uniformity of
result is to be pursued, the court of the forum should apply the
law of the place of wrong. Is the administrative inconvenience
of applying such a provision so great as to justify the court of
the forum to forsake the basic choice of law policy? It is an every-
day occurrence for courts to ascertain and apply foreign consti-
tutional and statutory law. Thus, ruling out the public policy of
the forum, the failure of courts to apply foreign provisions re-
quiring the jury to pass upon the issue of contributory negligence
does not seem justified.
In Hopkins v. Kurn,24 an action in Missouri upon a cause of
action arising in Oklahoma, the Missouri court refused to apply
at the forum, on the ground that it was procedural, a provision
of the Oklahoma constitution providing that, in all cases, the de-
20. The same holds true in the obverse case unless it is taken for granted
at the outset that such a constitutional provision or statute of the forum
expresses such a strong public policy that any different foreign rule will be
disregarded.
21. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 594.
22. Hopkins v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 41, 171 S.W. (2d) 625, 149 A.L.R. 762 (1943);
Colucci v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 121 Misc. 758, 202 N.Y. Supp. 717 (S.Ct. 1923);
Singer v. Messina, 312 Pa. 129, 167 Atl. 583, 89 A.L.R. 1271 (1933); Boureston
v. Boureston, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939).
23. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 51 S.Ct. 383, 75 L.Ed. 857
(1931); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Spencer, 20 F.(2d) 714 (C.C.A. 9th, 1927);
Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Mills, 184 Ark. 61, 41 S.W.(2d) 971 (1931); Jackson
v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 224 Mo. App. 601, 31 S.W.(2d) 250 (1930),
overruled in Hopkins v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 41, 171 S.W.(2d) 625, 149 A.L.R. 762
(1943).
24. 351 Mo, 41, 171 S.W.(2d) 625, 149 A.L.R. 762 (1943).
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fense of contributory negligence is a question of fact for the
jury. The court's classification was based primarily on Oklahoma
cases25 holding, in purely domestic situations, the provision to
be procedural. It is obvious that the classification made by the
court of the forum was not influenced by choice of law policy.
What are the motivating forces behind such a classification?
Perhaps purely local policy considerations prompt the result. It
may well be that the court of the forum is of the opinion that its
own rule is based upon sound principles and that to enforce an-
other rule would be contrary to its public policy. Certainly a
court is not to be condemned for refusing to follow a rule which
is contrary to the public policy of the forum, but in so doing the
court should not cloud the issue, in order to justify its decision,
by improperly classifying a foreign rule as a matter or procedure.
Such a classification can only serve to mislead other courts in
similar cases. If the refusal to apply the foreign rule is based
upon public policy the court should plainly say so. If the court
of the forum finds no compelling policy reasons why the foreign
rule should not be applied, it is submitted that, in the interest of
uniformity of result, the rule should be adopted.
Usually the place of wrong has no constitutional or statutory
provision providing that the issue of contributory negligence
must go to the jury, but does have rules, found in the case law,
regulating the functions of the court and jury on the issue. If the
decisional rule of the place of wrong would require the trial
judge, on the facts shown, to hold the plaintiff guilty of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law, should the court of the forum
seek out this rule and apply it or should the court apply its own
pertinent rule, if different? Or conversely, if the rule of the forum
requires the court, on a given set of facts, to find contributory
negligence as a matter of law, should the court do so notwith-
standing a contrary rule of the place of wrong? Again the cases
are in conflict. Some take the view that the rules are substantive
and must be applied at the forum; 26 others view such rules as
procedural and refuse to apply them.27 Because such rules often
25. Independent Cotton 0il Co. v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 Pac. 969
(1911); Muskogee Vitrified Brick Co. v. Napier, 34 Okla. 618, 126 Pac. 792
(1912).
26. Smith v. Brown, 302 Mass. 432, 19 N.E.(2d) 732 (1939); Pilgrim v.
MacGibbon, 313 Mass. 290, 47 N.E. (2d) 299 (1943); Wieden v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S. Ste. M. R.R., 181 Minn. 235, 232 N.W. 109 (1930); Kuba v. New York
Central R.R., 143 S.W.(2d) 332 (Mo. App. 1940); Busker v. New York Central
R.R., 149 S.W.(2d) 449 (Mo. App. 1941).
27. Savannah, F. & W. R.R. v. Evans, 115 Ga. 315, 41 S.E. 631, 90 Am.
St. Rep. 116 (1902); Gregory v. Maine Central R.R., 317 Mass. 636, 59 N.E.(2d)
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have an important bearing upon the outcome of the case, it is
desirable to classify them as matters of substance. The court,
however, may find that it will be unduly inconvenienced and de-
layed by expending the time and energy necessary to ascertain
and apply the rule correctly. Sometimes the rule is not clearly
defined and the court is faced with the problem of analyzing
numerous foreign cases, ironing out apparent conflicts, and dis-
carding irrelevant material. If such be the case, the court of the
forum may justifiably classify the rule as procedural and refuse
to give it application.
Problems relative to the functions of the court and jury on
the issue of contributory negligence are of little practical im-
portance in Louisiana. Jury trials, expensive and time consuming,
are rare in this state due to the peculiar provisions 28 of the Lou-
isiana Constitution allowing appellate courts to review, inde-
pendently, both the law and facts of a case. No litigant could
seriously contend that he is entitled to have a jury verdict on
the issue of contributory negligence which would preclude the
reviewing court from making an independent decision.
The foregoing discussion has assumed, of course, that the
laws of both the forum and the place of wrong provide for trial
by jury. Situations may occur, however, where the place of wrong
provides for jury trials and the forum makes no such provision
at all, especially if the forum is in a foreign country. It is obvious
that a litigant, in such a case, is not entitled to a jury. Converse-
ly, if the forum provides for trial by jury and the place of wrong
does not, the machinery of the forum will prevail. A litigant,
suing on a cause of action arising, for instance, in Mexico, where
civil juries are unknown, must, of course, accept the peculiar
structure of the judiciary existing at the forum. Choice of law
notwithstanding, it is too much to ask the forum to furnish the
exact machinery existing at the place of wrong.
Contributory Negligence and the Burden of Proof
If we are to accept as correct the suggestion that procedural
rules are those which concern methods of presenting to a court
the operative facts upon which legal relations depend and that
substantive rules are those which concern the legal effect of
those facts after they have been established, the rules relating
471, 159 A.L.R. 714 (1945); Franklin v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R.,
179 Minn. 480, 229 N.W. 797 (1930); Jones v. Louisiana Western R.R., 243 S.W.
976 (Tex. 1922).
28. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §§ 10, 29.
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to burden of proof must necessarily be classified as procedural.
The weight of authority is in favor of such a classification.2 9 The
cases, particularly the older ones, usually state the general rule
relating to substance and procedure and hold, as a matter of
course, that rules regulating the burden of proving contributory
negligence are procedural. Documentation, when given in sup-
port of the holding, frequently consists of non-conflict of laws
cases"° holding particular burden of proof rules to be procedural
in nature. The courts following the majority view seemingly are
indifferent to arguments that choice of law policies are ignored
without adequate justification.
A few older cases,31 principally in the federal courts, held
that matters relating to burden of proof are of a substantive
nature. The case of Precourt v. Driscol132 gave the minority view
a much needed shot in the arm. The case involved a conflict be-
tween local and foreign burden of proof rules. By the law of the
forum, contributory negligence was an affirmative defense to be
pleaded and proved by the defendant. By the law of the place
of wrong, the plaintiff had the burden of proving himself free
from fault. The plaintiff argued that burden of proof is a proce-
dural matter to be governed by the law of the forum. The court,
holding the foreign rule applicable, said:
"If the local remedy results in destroying or altering the
foreign cause of action, the ends of comity are not only de-
feated, but rights are given or liabilities imposed in respect
to a foreign transaction affecting its legal character. One way
to avoid such a result is to take no jurisdiction. . . .The other
way is to make an exception to the rule applying the local
law when the foreign remedy is so inseparable from the cause
of action that it must be enforced to preserve the integrity
and character of the cause and when such remedy is prac-
29. Representative cases: Kingery v. Donnel, 222 Iowa 241, 268 N.W. 617
(1936); Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919); Gregory v. Maine
Central R.R., 317 Mass. 636, 59 N.E.(2d) 471, 159 A.L.R. 714 (1945); Jenkins v.
Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 124 Minn. 368, 145 N.W. 40 (1914); Menard v.
Goltna, 328 Mo. 368, 40 S.W.(2d) 1053 (1931); Midland Trail Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Martin, 100 Ind. 206, 194 N.E. 862; Wright v. Palmison, 237 App. Div. 22, 260
N.Y. Supp. 812 (S.Ct. 1932).
30. Typical of the cases cited are those involving retroactive application
of statutes changing the burden of proof. Duggan v. Bay State Ry., 230
Mass. 370, 119 N.E. 757 (1918) and Southern Indiana Ry. v. Peyton, 157 Ind.
690, 61 N.E. 722 (1901) are illustrative.
31. Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 35 S.Ct. 865, 59
L.Ed. 1433 (1915); New Orleans & Northwestern R.R. v. Har ris, 247 U.S.
354, 38 S.Ct. 504, 62 L.Ed. 1156 (1917); Southern Ry. v. Robertson, 7 Ga. App.
154, 66 S.E. 535 (1909).
32. 85 N.H. 280, 157 Atl. 525, 78 A.L.R. 874 (1931).
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tically available. The vindication of substantive rights should
not mean their loss or alteration, and, when no local policy is
adversely affected, strict adherence to a rule which becomes
arbitrary and works injustice in a given case may well be
dispensed with. '33
It was found that the foreign burden of proof rule was in-
dispensable to the enforcement of the plaintiff's substantive rights.
The foreign requirement that the plaintiff prove himself free
from fault was interpreted as being a condition of the cause of
action itself, and the court held that the rule was applicable at
the forum. The decision served the laudable purpose of bringing
out into the open important choice of law policies. The court
manifested an unusual sensitivity to the plea for a uniform solu-
tion to a foreign cause of action. The drafters of the Restatement
of the Conflict of Laws, recognizing the force of the decision,
adopted the rule.34 The direction having been pointed out, other
courts are following. 3 5
In Sampson v. Channel,3" the court, in a somewhat unortho-
dox analysis, held that rules relating to the burden of proof of
contributory negligence are matters of substance and must be
followed by federal courts under the doctrine of Erie v. Tomp-
kins.3 7 Approaching the analysis suggested by some of the modern
writers, 3 the court pointed out that substance and procedure are
not clear cut categories with a definite line dividing one from
the other. The confusion prevalent in the cases substantiates
this observation. It was said that a matter may properly be clas-
sified as procedural for one purpose and as substantive for an-
other. Classification, observed the court, should be made only
when the purpose of classifying is clearly understood. It was
found that if the policy considerations of the Erie case are to be
given full effect, it is necessary for a federal court to classify rules
governing the burden of proof as substantive matters. This is so
because the burden of proof in negligence cases often determines
the outcome of the case, and the rationale of the Erie case is that
the federal court, in diversity of citizenship cases, should reach
33. 85 N.H. 280, 283, 157 Atl. 525, 527.
34. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 595, Comment a.
35. Olsen v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 131 Neb. 94, 267 N.W. 246 (1936);
Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 Pa. (2d) 118, 168 A.L.R. 177 (1947).
36. 110 F.(2d) 754 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940), 128 A.L.R. 394 (1940), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 650, 60 S. Ct. 1099, 84 L.Ed. 1415 (1940).
37. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
38. Hancock, op. cit. supra note 7, at 76; Cook, supra note 9; Morgan,
supra note 9.
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the same result as the court of the state in which it is sitting. It
was also pointed out that there is no important counter-considera-
tion because the state burden of proof rule can be easily ascer-
tained and applied by the federal court.
That the burden of proof is often the decisive factor in tort
cases cannot be disputed. It follows, therefore, that when a court
refuses to apply the foreign burden of proof rule, the plaintiff's
chances of recovering in the same manner and to the same extent
as if the action had been brought at the place of wrong are either
enlarged or diminished. Uniformity of result is certainly not ac-
complished. If we admit the validity of the basic choice of law
policy, it must be agreed that the court of the forum should clas-
sify as procedural only those foreign laws which would seriously
inconvenience the court and hamper the effective administration
of justice. The court should not be influenced by a classification
made in a purely domestic case; its classification should be con-
trolled by choice of law policy. Is there any strong countervailing
argument to justify the court of the forum to classify a burden
of proof rule as procedural? Such cases as Sampson v. Channel
and Precourt v. Driscoll furnish the answer. Certainly it cannot
be said that ascertaining and applying a foreign burden of proof
rule is so onerous a duty as to justify a court to place the ideal of
uniformity in jeopardy. The proper rule, then, is that the court
of the forum should apply the foreign rule regulating the burden
of proving contributory negligence.
The Louisiana cases3 9 recognize the general distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural matters, but no cases have been
found which discuss the precise problems treated herein. Un-
bound by precedents, the way is open for the courts of Louisiana
to give full effect to the basic choice of law policies.
LELAND H. COLTHARP, JR.*
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
When there is a conflict between the statute of limitations of
the forum and that of a foreign jurisdiction, the law of which
applies generally to the legal relation in question (lex causae),
which statute should be applied? The general rule in Anglo-
American common law, contrary to that prevailing on the conti-
39. Wasson v. Gatling, 184 So. 596 (La. App. 1938); Matney v. Blue Rib-
bon, Inc., 12 So.(2d) 249 (1942), affirmed 202 La. 505, 12 So.(2d) 253 (1942).
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, DeRidder Bar.
